“Filling in”, thought experiments and intuitions by Shaffer, Michael J.
Episteme
http://journals.cambridge.org/EPI
Additional services for Episteme:
Email alerts: Click here
Subscriptions: Click here
Commercial reprints: Click here
Terms of use : Click here
“FILLING IN”, THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND INTUITIONS
Michael J. Shaffer
Episteme / FirstView Article / July 2016, pp 1 - 8
DOI: 10.1017/epi.2016.15, Published online: 25 July 2016
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1742360016000150
How to cite this article:
Michael J. Shaffer “FILLING IN”, THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND INTUITIONS.
Episteme, Available on CJO 2016 doi:10.1017/epi.2016.15
Request Permissions : Click here
Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/EPI, IP address: 129.105.215.146 on 22 Aug 2016
“filling in”, thought experiments and
intuitions
michael j. shaffer
mjshaffer@stcloudstate.edu
abstract
Recently Timothy Williamson has argued that characterizations of the standard
(i.e. intuition-based) philosophical practice of philosophical analysis are misguided
because of the erroneous manner in which this practice has been understood. In
doing so he implies that experimental critiques of the reliability of intuition are
based on this misunderstanding of philosophical methodology and so have little
or no bearing on actual philosophical practice or results. His main point is that
the orthodox understanding of philosophical methodology is incorrect in that it
treats philosophical thought experiments in such a way that they can be “lled
in” in various ways that undermines their use as counter-examples and that intu-
ition plays no substantial role in philosophical practice when we properly under-
stand that methodology as a result of the possibility of such lling in. In this
paper Williamson’s claim that philosophical thought experiments cases can be le-
gitimately lled in this way will be challenged and it will be shown that the experi-
mental critique of the intuition-based methods involved a serious issue.
1. introduction
Recently Timothy Williamson (2007) has argued that characterizations of the standard
(i.e. intuition-based) philosophical practice of philosophical analysis are misguided be-
cause of the erroneous manner in which this practice has been understood. Let us refer
to this practice as the standard justication procedure (SJP). Moreover, in doing so he im-
plies that experimental critiques of the reliability of intuition are based on this misunder-
standing of philosophical methodology and so have little or no bearing on actual
philosophical practice or results.1 A number of criticisms have been leveled against
Williamson’s reconstruction of the Gettier argument and the re-interpretation of SJP
that he believes follows from it, but they have been addressed by Williamson.2 His
main point is that SJP is incorrect in that it treats philosophical thought experiments in
such a way that they can be “lled in” in various ways that undermines their use as
counter-examples and that intuition plays no substantial role in philosophical practice
when we properly modify SJP as a result of the possibility of such lling in. In this
paper Williamson’s claim that philosophical thought experiments can be legitimately
1 See for example Weinberg et al. (2001) and Weinberg (2007).
2 See, for example, Ichikwa and Jarvis (2009) and Ichikawa (2009). Williamson (2009, 2011) contain his
responses.
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lled in this way will be challenged. As a result, it will be shown that one can salvage the
original account of SJP in a much simpler way that both reects an important fact about
thought experiments and philosophical practice and makes the experimental critique of
the intuition-based methods involved a serious issue.
2. williamson’s “filling in” objection and philosophical
intuition
His critical attack on standard accounts of philosophical analyses is framed in terms of
Gettier’s infamous cases and he takes the standard form of such an appeal to involve
the following claims:
K(x, p): x knows that p.
JTB(x, p): x has justied true belief that p.
GC(x, p): x stands to p as in the Gettier text.
According to Williamson, the Gettier argument is then supposed to have the following
form that is characteristic of SJP:
P1 S∃x∃pGC x,p( ).
P2 A∀x∀[GC x, p( )  (JTB x, p( )&¬K x, p( ))].
[C S∃x∃pJTB x, p( )&¬K x, p( ).
Williamson’s formalization of this argument then just says that it is possible that some
x stands to some p as described in the Gettier case and that necessarily if any x stands
to any p as in the Gettier case, then x has a justied true belief that p but does not
know that p. So, it is possible for p to have a justied true belief that p but not know
that p. So, the theory Gettier (1963) is challenging in his famous paper is of course the
claim that knowledge is justied, true belief: □∀x∀p[JTB(x, p) ≡ K(x, p)]. But, the con-
clusion of the Gettier argument contradicts this claim. So, given this case of SJP so ren-
dered, the intuition that □∀x∀p[GC(x, p)  (JTB(x, p) & ¬ K(x, p))] (i.e. the intuition
that necessarily if any x stands to any p as in the Gettier case, then x has a justied
true belief that p but does not know that p) is supposed to refute the JTB analysis of
knowledge.
Williamson’s attack on this account of SJP is based on the claim that□∀x∀p[GC(x, p)
(JTB(x, p) & ¬ K(x, p))] is false. In other words, it is not true that necessarily if any x
stands to any p as in the Gettier case, then x has a justied true belief that p but does
not know that p. His reason for making this contention is that GC(x, p) (i.e. the
Gettier case) is an under-described model or simulation and that it can be “lled in” in
a variety of ways. In some cases lled in versions of GC(x, p) – let us indicate them as
the set GC(x, p)* – are such that it will be the case that ¬(JTB(x, p) & ¬ K(x, p)). In
some cases lled in versions of the Gettier case will be such that it is not the case that x
has a justied true belief that p but does not know that p. So, Williamson concludes
that actual premises that serve the function of P2-type premises do not have the form
that P2 has. He then proceeds to suggest an alternative form for the premises that serve
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the function of P2 in Gettier arguments and other philosophical thought experiments. He
specically suggests that they have the following form:
P2′ ∃x∃pGC x, p( )A ∀x∀p[GC x,p( )  JTB x,p( )&¬K x,p( ))].(
This is just the counterfactual claim that if some x were to stand to some p as in the Gettier
case, then x would have a justied true belief that p but not knowledge that p. But this
formulation is problematic because were we to replace P2 with P2′ the conclusion does
not follow.3 Nor is it acceptable to replace P2′with the following principle:
P2′′ S∃x∃pGC x, p( )A ∀x∀p[GC x,p( )  JTB x,p( )&¬K x,p( ))].(
This is the claim that if some x were to stand to some p as in the Gettier case, then it would
be the case that if any x stands to p as in the Gettier case, then x has a justied true belief
that p but does not know that p. This is because Williamson does not accept the modal
logic S5 and believes that requiring those who consider philosophical thought experiments
to be aware of the relevant principle of S5 is simply too unrealistic.4 But a number of prob-
lematic issues have been raised in reference to P2′ and P2′′.5 Despite these worries he
ofcially settles on P2′ as the correct form of P2-type premises in his 2007 book.6
Ultimately, Williamson argues on this basis that (1) philosophical thought experiments
do not deal with conceptual possibility; (2) that philosophical theories deal with meta-
physical possibility; (3) that counterfactuals are more basic than metaphysical possibilities;
and (4) that intuitions play no real role in philosophical thought experiments. So, as he
sees the matter, SJP needs to be re-interpreted as the philosophical attempt to determine
true counterfactuals which indicate metaphysical possibilities by appeal to the evidence
that is constituted by the totality of our knowledge (rather than by our supposed intui-
tions).7 As he says, “Paradigm thought experiments in philosophy are simply valid argu-
ments about counterfactual possibilities” (Williamson 2007: 207). In support of (4) he
tells us that,
Philosophers might be better off not using the word “intuition” and its cognates. The main current
function is not to answer questions about the nature of the evidence on offer but to fudge them, by
appearing to provide answers without really doing so. (Williamson 2007: 220)
Moreover, in a more positive manner he claims that, “In philosophy as in the natural
sciences, our evidence consists of ordinary human knowledge” (Williamson 2007: 276).
He expands on this theme and further claims that,
Our evidence in philosophy consists of miscellaneous mass of language, expressed in terms of all
kinds, some from ordinary language, some from the theoretical vocabulary of various disciplines.
3 See Williamson (2007: 195–6).
4 See Williamson (2007: 157).
5 See Ichikawa (2009) and Ichikawa and Jarvis (2009).
6 See Williamson (2007: 204).
7 This is of course an appeal to Williamson’s (2000) E = K thesis in the context of philosophical
methodology.
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Some of it consists of knowledge of our own mental states; most of it does not. Whatever we know
is legitimate evidence . . . This messy epistemological predicament in which philosophers nd them-
selves is not deeply different from the messy epistemological predicament of all human inquiry.
(Williamson 2007: 277)
With respect to P2′-type propositions, Williamson then is committed to the idea that such
propositions are not known in some special “intuitive” manner. Rather, they are known
on the basis of a variety of common epistemic sources that are used to constrain imagin-
ation. He tells us explicitly that we evaluate counterfactual P2′-type premises in his mod-
ied version of SJP, “. . . using a mixture of imaginative simulation, background
information and logic” (Williamson 2011: 216).8 So Williamson’s rejection of SJP and
his modication of that account of philosophical practice ultimately lead to the conclusion
that intuition plays no real role in philosophical method at all. Our evidence for counter-
factual claims about metaphysical possibility is just our ordinary knowledge about how
things are and about logic as applied to imaginary cases, rather than the outputs of
some special faculty, special evidentially endowed propositional attitudes towards
modal propositions or special knowledge of epistemic or conceptual possibilities.
3. responding to the “filling in” objection
Recall that Williamson’s motivation for rejecting P2 and considering P2′ and P2′′ is that
G(x, p) can be “lled in” in different ways, some of which allow for the truth of
[G(x, p) & ¬(JTB(x, p) & ¬ K(x, p))] (i.e. the claim that one can be in a Gettier case
where it is not the case that one has a justied true belief but not knowledge). Consider
the following sort of response to Gettier’s second Jones case. Recall that in this version
of GC(x, p) Smith infers that either Jones owns a Ford or that Brown is in Barcelona
from the claim that Jones owns a Ford. Moreover, Smith has strong evidence for the
claim that Jones owns a Ford. Suppose, for example that he has seen a title on the seat
of Jones’ car for a Ford of that model. But, it is false that Jones owns a Ford and true
that Brown is in Barcelona. Jones does not own a Ford because it is a rented Ford and
it is merely coincidental that Brown happens to be in Barcelona. As a result, it is alleged
that Smith meets the JTB conditions with respect to the proposition that either Jones owns
a Ford or that Brown is in Barcelona but does not know that. Williamson’s lling-in ob-
jection then amounts to the idea that there are legitimate ways to ll in thought experi-
ments because they are chronically under-described and such that they undermine the
P2-type sentence involved in that case of SJP. So, what Williamson has in mind are
cases where the person considering the thought experiment adds details to the scenario
that compromise the integrity of the case as a counter-example. Williamson claims that:
. . . in the Gettier case, if the subject’s inference to the true belief p from false belief q bizarrely hap-
pens to trigger awkward memories or apparent memories that cast doubt on q, the effect may be to
lose justication for q rather than gain it for p . . . Similarly, when moral philosophers assess im-
aginary examples, one can almost always ll out the case with unintended but morally relevant
additions that would reverse the verdict. (Williamson 2007: 185)
8 See Williamson (2007: 141–65).
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With respect to the second Gettier case then, what Williamson is claiming is that P2 is false
because we might ll out this particular schematic version of G(x, p) with additional informa-
tion such that Jones no longer meets the JTB condition or such that Jones really does know,
thus defusing the counter-example. For example, in an egregious case of lling in one might
add to the second Jones case the factoid that Smith has been told that Jones was taking the
title for the Ford of that model to a friend who is the holder of that title. But, the contention
that this is permissible is not at all reective of the way in which philosophical thought experi-
ments (and scientic thought experiments) are employed. Essentially, the point to be made
here is that the descriptions of thought experiments are not supposed to be lled in at all
in the proper conduct of SJP. This is part and parcel of the practice of the sort of idealizing
and abstracting that occurs in thought experiments in both philosophy and science.
Consider the following analog of the alleged “lling in” phenomenon in a scientic
context. Simon Stevin’s work on the inclined plane was crucial in developing understand-
ing of motion and friction.9 He established that the force required to hold a ball in place
on an inclined plane is inversely proportional to the length of the plane. This was accom-
plished by appeal to a thought experiment constructed as follows. Suppose that we have a
prism shaped inclined plane over which we have draped a chain of fourteen closed balls as
shown in Figure 1:
Suppose further that we want to know what will happen to an open chain draped over
the plane as illustrated in Figure 2:
What Stevins asks us to do is to imagine what motion will occur when the cut is made.
The relevant possibilities are that the chain would move to the right, to the left or not at
all, and we are asked to appeal to our intuition to determine what will happen. What is
crucial is that we are supposed to understand that in Figure 1 the system is in equilibrium
and so does not move. The point of the thought experiment is of course to come to under-
stand that this will remain so when the chain is cut. However, this crucially presumes that
we do not ll in the following fact: there is perpetual motion. If motion is allowed to be
perpetual, then the conclusions about the motions involved and the force required to hold
a ball in place do not follow. So, the presumption of the imaginary exercise involves pre-
cluding lling in this detail (as well as many others), and it would constitute a serious mis-
understanding of the experiment to respond to Stevins’ ingenious experiment by
supposing that perpetual motion is possible. To do so would undermine the crucial insight
that the chain is in static equilibrium in both cases, and from a methodological perspective
this is to miss the very point of the sort of idealizing and abstracting that is essential to the
thought experiment. The context in which the imagined case is being employed simply
presupposes that such lling in is not permitted. So, the prescription against lling in sug-
gested here is not at all unique to philosophical thought experiments.
So, an alternative gloss of P2 that reects this fact about thought experiments and mod-
els is as follows:
P2′′′A∀x∀p[ GC x,p( )& Ix( )  JTB x,p( )&¬K x,p( ))].(
Here Ix stands for the claim that x’s state is not affected by any factors not explicitly men-
tioned in G(x, p). P2′′′ then says that necessarily if anyone stands to p as in the Gettier case
9 See Stevin (1955). See also Mach (1960), Brown (1991) and Gendler (2004) concerning this example.
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and there are no additional factors involved, then x has a justied true belief that p but not
knowledge that p. So, Ix rules out all of the lled in scenarios that are elements of G(x, p)
*. So, Ix is a sort of completeness idealization (much like those that are often assumed in
the context of scientic thought experiments), whereby one who is entertaining G(x, p)
properly is to wholly ignore any other factors that might inuence what is supposed to
be going on in GC(x, p). The content of the intuition represented by P2′′′ is then one
that importantly involves a simplifying assumption. However, this correctly reects a
number of important features of thought experiments and their use in philosophy. First,
this alternative rendering of P2 explains the familiar pedagogical practice of correcting stu-
dents who respond to philosophical (and scientic) thought experiments by adding in fea-
tures to such cases that defuse the counter-examples and thus result in their
misunderstanding the argument in such cases. Second, this also explains why this kind
of instruction is a key component of learning to be an academic philosopher in particular.
What we learn to do in philosophy very early on is to examine abstract and simplied
cases that are alleged to have philosophical import. Doing so correctly requires refraining
from lling in any details. Third, lling in also fails to capture the idea that, at least in
terms of SJP, philosophical results are typically highly abstract in nature.
Fig. 1. Uncut.
Fig. 2. Cut.
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4. conclusion
So, lling in misrepresents pedagogical aspects of philosophical practice. To ll in the
Gettier case so as to defuse the counter-example is also to misunderstand Gettier cases
and other philosophical thought experiments as being elliptical descriptions waiting for
completion by the person considering them. This is because philosophical thought experi-
ments are not elliptical descriptions of the actual world, nor are they elliptical descriptions
of other complete worlds. They are better understood to be representations of how things
are in other simpler possible worlds that are still similar to complete worlds in some
respects. As in the case of scientic thought experiments, they are supposed to allow us
to focus on a small set of salient features completely independent of any factors not expli-
cit in the description of the case. Ironically, Williamson actually defends this view himself
in speaking of the character of an imaginary thought-experiment where a hunter imagines
jumping a stream when he says,
But he neither makes himself imagine succeeding nor makes himself imagine failing. Rather, hav-
ing forced the initial conditions, he lets the rest of the imaginative exercise unfold without further
interference. For that remainder, his imagination operates in involuntary mode. He imagines the
antecedent of the conditional voluntarily, the consequent involuntarily. Left to itself, the imagin-
ation develops the scenario in a reality-oriented way, by default. (Williamson 2016: 116)
All of this importantly means that philosophical thought experiments are designed to ex-
plore a much wider space of possibilities than in standard accounts of worlds that only
include complete worlds and that they are importantly but implicitly qualied by
“no-lling-on” qualiers. This renders such results dependent on the simplifying assump-
tions and makes them often highly abstract, but this better reects the nature of philosoph-
ical results as understood in terms of SJP. As a result, one can re-cast the SJP slightly
without running into the sorts of problems with P2′ and P2′′ and such that it acknowl-
edges these apparent features of philosophical practice as follows:
P1 S∃x∃p GC x,p( )&Ix( )
P2′′′A∀x∀p[ GC x,p( )&Ix( )  (JTB x, p( )&¬K x,p( ))].
[C S∃x∃pJTB x,p( )&¬K x,p( ).
First, on this schematic account of SJP such arguments are valid and pace Williamson the
claims that play the role of P2-type propositions in his reconstruction of such arguments
are not false in this alternative construction. These sorts of claims, when properly regimen-
ted as P2′′′-type propositions can be true, whether or not one endorses SJP and whether or
not one is skeptical of the practice in general. Second, while it is surely possible that
Williamson is correct in his assertion that P2-type propositions are actually counterfac-
tuals, this is not because of the lling in objection. Moreover, all of this implies that the
issue of whether P2′′′-type propositions can be the objects of intuition in a way that secures
them as knowledge is a legitimate worry absent some other reason to hold that P2-type
propositions are counterfactuals whose epistemic status is intuition-independent. It is like-
ly that Williamson is right to point out that intuition does not play a role in philosophical
thought experiments, but this is the case because appeals to intuition are unreliable (as
suggested by various experimental studies) or irrelevant to philosophical practice and
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not because standard philosophical practice involves counterfactual scenarios that can be
lled in so as to undermine their roles as counter-examples.
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